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Despite their obvious and enormous importance, it’s easy
for philosophers to ignore the economic forces that shape the
human use of animals. The tools we bring to bear on the problems of animal use and abuse are generally focused on individuals—e.g., their moral failings, their epistemic shortcomings,
and so on. Increasingly, of course, philosophers are devoting
more attention to structural factors that influence our beliefs
and behaviors, but very few of us know enough of the relevant
social science to theorize about them in detail. In such circumstances, Stephen McMullen’s Animals and the Economy is an
especially welcome contribution to the literature.
Setting aside the introduction and conclusion, the book has
ten chapters. In the first two, McMullen summarizes the status
of animals in the economy—namely, the normal ways in which
they are used, the economic institutions that promote and preserve that use, and the various respects in which economic theory is stacked against recognizing the interests of animals. The
next two chapters provide a depressing overview of the reasons
why the economy fails to provide consumers with products that
were derived from animals who enjoy(ed) decent lives, and
generally stands in the way of ethical consumer action. Nevertheless, he tries to show that consumers remain responsible for
purchasing morally objectionable animal products, and makes
the case that consumer action does in fact make a difference.
In the following pair of chapters, McMullen considers producers. He shows that, in our current regulatory system, they
have few options other than sacrificing welfare for the sake of
profit: the margins are just too slim. He also contends that regulation could, in fact, improve the situation of animals, and he
makes some tentative suggestions about how those regulations
might function.
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Finally, after a brief discussion of animal experimentation,
McMullen uses the remaining chapters to explore the notion of
animals as property. Gary Francione, of course, argues that the
basic right of animals is not to be human property. McMullen
argues, to the contrary, that we don’t need to abandon entirely
the property framework to achieve the aims we might have for
animals, and, in fact, preserving that framework may actually
provide us with some tools to promote their rights and wellbeing. The book wraps up with an alternative theory of animal
ownership that’s designed to secure just these ends.
Anyone working in animal ethics ought to make time for
this thoughtful introduction to, and reflection on the possible
futures of, the place of animals in the economy. It is wellresearched, accessible, and full of striking insights into the
mechanisms behind all too familiar practices. There is much
on which to comment, but I’ll limit myself to the issue that I
found particularly striking: namely, McMullen’s discussion of
consumer responsibility.
Let me summarize, very briefly, just a few of the points that
McMullen makes about the way that the economy stacks the
deck against the interests of animals.
Most obviously, the mere fact that something is for sale tends
to signal that it’s permissible to buy and consume it. You can’t
purchase human arms in the grocery store, but you can certainly buy chicken wings. That strongly suggests that there’s a categorical difference between them, and we shouldn’t overlook
the way that what’s for sale shapes our moral vision. But even
if we set aside the symbolic significance of animal products
being commodities, we can see that our particular economy is
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set up to enable and encourage the purchasing of animal bodies
and byproducts.
Consider, first, that consumer preferences are shaped in part
by advertising campaigns, some of which are federally funded,
and which are heavily skewed toward animal products. Second,
a large market economy makes it difficult to know how goods
are produced, and there are legitimate reasons to be suspicious
about the various sources of information available to consumers. Ethical information is, after all, difficult to communicate
effectively credibly to consumers: this creates a “systematic
bias toward goods whose primary virtues are visible quality or
low-cost” (55). Third, there is also a bias toward goods that are
entirely fungible, which strongly incentivizes the kind of mass
production that’s so harmful to animals.
Fourth, agricultural markets have three features that spread
responsibility across producers, distributors, and consumers.
For instance, the harms to animals are overdetermined. No
one individual is necessary for them to occur. Moreover, the
choices people make are interdependent. Each one relies on the
acts of others to accomplish his or her ends. Additionally, the
decision that actually results in harm isn’t due to a single factor.
Instead, a long list of considerations explains why welfare standards are such as they are in factory farms. Finally, McMullen
surveys some experimental work that seems to show that moral
considerations are less likely to guide our behavior as markets
exhibit more and more of these features. So, it seems that the
size and structure of the market make it quite difficult to feel
accountable for the harms of animal agriculture, which lowers
the odds that consumers will be motivated to lobby for significant changes.
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Now, McMullen doesn’t spend much time arguing that consumers bear some responsibility for their purchasing decisions.
Nor does he say much about the extent of this responsibility,
or whether it rises to the level of making individual purchases
morally wrong. However, it’s clear that he does think that consumers bear some responsibility and that they can act wrongly
by purchasing; if this weren’t his view, it would be hard to explain why he would spend so much time arguing that there are,
in fact, things that consumers can do to improve the lot of animals. Nevertheless, it seems to me that there is reason to wonder whether his work undermines the charge that consumers
act wrongly by buying animal products, whatever their origins.
Here, in short, is the line of reasoning that I have in mind.
When people act wrongly, we tend to blame them for
it. There are, of course, plenty of cases in which people act
wrongly but excusably, and then we don’t. But those aren’t the
norm. Instead, those are circumstances where unusual factors somehow change the relevant moral calculus. With that in
mind, note that we ordinarily don’t blame consumers for buying animal products. This isn’t because they have no choice
but to buy meat and milk: there are plenty of morally superior
options available. However, the structural forces just outlined
have some notable affects. They shape and satisfy consumer
demand, they increase the burden on anyone who wants to
shop in nonstandard ways, they make it hard to know who to
trust for information, and the sheer size of the market makes
it plain that, at best, any individual’s impact is probabilistic,
which lowers the motivation to act. Moreover given how few
others are acting, an understandable (albeit unfortunate) fatalism tends to emerge. These facts seem to go a long way toward
explaining why we are so tolerant of those who purchase animal products, even when we are their friends and family, and
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so have standing to blame them. But if we don’t blame them,
then we should wonder whether they’re really acting wrongly.
Compare this to our decision not to blame one another for
failing to give much to charity. Parallel structural forces seem
to explain why we treat giving as supererogatory, appealing to
the better angels of our nature to promote good behavior. This
suggests that we think that while it would be very good to give,
and there are strong moral reasons to do so, they don’t rise—
in our particular circumstances, and contra Singer-style arguments—to the level of obligation. If the opposite were true, we
would expect our blaming practices to be quite different, at
least among those who have been moved by the relevant arguments. But they aren’t, and likewise with respect to purchasing
animal products. If all that’s so with respect to giving, it might
be so with respect to our food consumption patterns too.
I get no pleasure from this conclusion, and I hope that it’s
wrong. But it’s difficult to take a long, hard look at the powerful forces that influence and even constrain our behavior
without adopting a more modest view of the culpability that attaches to any one individual. Even if that’s right, however, there
may be a silver lining. Thinking clearly about the ethics of the
human use of animals may well require developing new, interdisciplinary conceptions of moral responsibility, ones that take
better account of the ways in which markets have sway over
our lives. McMullen’s book—and ones like it—could guide us
as we take the first steps down that path.
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